The United States has serious and worsening problems in the delivery and financing of health. The debate about reform has inspired many schemes that are persuasive in their presentation, but they are unrealistic: some cannot be enacted by Congress, others would not improve existing arrangements, most are imaginary inventions with uncertain outcomes. The most politically prudent and the most effective course is to emulate the methods used successfully and available for full analysis in other developed countries. America created its successful social security system in this fashion, and statutory health insurance should be added now. All or most groups would be required to join. Financing would come from social security payroll taxes, supplemented by government subsidies. Basic acute care services would be equally available to all. The existing insurance companies would remain as fiscal intermediaries. Doctors and hospitals would continue to work much as they do now. They would prosper from more utilization, few bad debts, and less administrative trouble. The payment and work of doctors would be governed by collective negotiations between the insurance carriers and the medical associations. -The payment and work of hospitals would be governed by a mixture of government regulations and negotiations with the carriers, Costs would be controlled by coordinated decision making by the payers, the providers, and government. The system would not turn over services and financing to government.
Many schemes are offered in journals and in conferences, in the hope they will save the country and will make the reputations of their inventors. Each is complex, each is supposed to be unique, and nearly all are imaginary, so that one cannot judge their feasibility in actual practice. The following paper will describe a fundamental reform that is not imaginary but that can be observed and evaluated in real life, in the principal developed countries of Western Europe. America's successful social security system was copied from Western Europe after careful study, and health care financing can be added to America's social security in the same way.
Employment Group insurance
When a country enacts social security and a health financing system, it usually strengthens and expands its previously voluntary and private arrangements: The mutual aid funds and insurance carriers remain as financial administrators; many or all persons are now required to join; premiums become taxes, to guarantee adequate financing; hospitals and doctors remain autonomous. All European countries have enacted such arrangements. (A few have replaced "national health insurance" with government-managed and tax-financed "national health services .") Complete details appear in Glaser 1991; the history is summarized in Kohler et al. 1982 .
Alone among developed countries, the United States went in a partially different direction. It enacted the social security pension, disability, work accident, and unemployment programs of Europe, but political deadlocks blocked statutory health insurance. Trade unions after World War I1 pressed employers to buy group health insurance as a fringe benefit of employment. Eventually it was assumed that these private arrangements would cover the entire American labor force and its dependents (Munts 1967) . Government would intervene only to cover the persons without jobs, in the form of Medicare and Medicaid. A uniquely American arrangement was supposed to achieve the same results as those of national health insurance and of national health services.
Group coverage through the workplace has always left many Americans without third-party protection. Persons covered experience cuts in benefits, when employers try to reduce their labor costs. Instead of pressing for the.nationa1 health insurance common in Europe, American reformers have tried to make employment-based insurance universal and more generous. Since the mid-l970s, every bill for statutory health insurance introduced into Congress has required all employers to arrange group insurance for all their employees, either by contracting with a carrier or by paying equivalent premiums to a public fund (an arrangement known as "play or pay"). The principal example during the 1980s was the Kennedy-Waxman Bill (Feder 1981) . The national commission to design health care financing for America recommended mandating employmentbased insurance, either by individual group contracts with carriers or by "play or pay" (Pepper Commission 1990) , and a variant (HealthAmerica) was sent to the floor of the Senate by the Committee on Labor and Human Resources in 1992. Hawaii and Massachusetts enacted such obligatory employment group laws within their jurisdictions (Lewin 1992; Goldberger 1990) , and other states have considered them (for example, Beauchamp and Rouse 1990) . Reforms proposed by many individuals rely on mandating employment group insurance (for example, Enthoven and Kronick 1989) .
Political Obstacles
None of these schemes can accomplish the goal of full coverage of the population. The first problem is that none can be enacted by the United States Congress. The principal source of the uninsured is employment in small business. Most of these owners do not want to provide any fringe benefits for their workers. They are ideologically committed to self-help: they believe everyone should pay for his own health care and insurance. Many of these employees are part-time or occasional workers, not included in any pension or health plans that small firms might have.
Small business is very influential in the United States House of Representatives and in all lower houses of state legislatures. No mandate of truly universal employment group health insurance with standard benefits can be enacted by Congress or by any state legislature. In order to reduce the number of negative votes, the authors of bills (such as KennedyWaxman) exempt all very small business (for example, with six or fewer employees), phase in moderate-size small business (for example, with six to twenty-five employees) over a long period and require them to offer a lower level of benefits.
The political compromises result in such a low requirement of benefits that government must subsidize the covered employees of small business, as well as paying in full for the workers in completely exempt firms. This contradicts the theory of employment group coverage and falls victim to American government's need to reduce deficits. For example, the Massachusetts Health Security Act permitted small business to opt out of insurance coverage of its workers by paying the state government a tax of $1,680 per worker per year-the origins of the enfeebling play-or-pay method-and the state government was expected to pay for full benefits for the worker and his entire family. Even this was too much for small business, who pressed the new governor and the legislature to repeal the act before implementation. Even if it had been carried out in its original form in Massachusetts, the workers and dependents in the small business sector would have received limited benefits (Blendon et al. 1992 ). The much-touted Prepaid Health Care Act of Hawaii is incomplete too: employers need not include in their groups dependents, part-time workers, and seasonal workers.
Defects in Design
If it could be enacted, universal employment group insurance would preserve on a larger scale all the defects in the current American health insurance system, going far beyond the present omission of the uninsured alone. (Some of these technical weaknesses are evident in U.S. House of Representatives 1990 and in Congressional Budget Office 1991 .) Following are several basic defects in America's current employment group insurance that would persist.
The system will still lack any methods of financial redistribution. Each employed group will continue to be experience-rated (if an insurance company is the carrier) or will pay only its own costs (if the employer self-insures). There will be no equalization mechanism, so that the more affluent groups, industries, and geographical regions contribute to the costs of the less affluent.
Preferred-risk selection of groups by insurance companies will continue. The insurance industry will still have large marketing costs to find and sign up the healthier and more affluent groups.
Benefits would vary among employer groups, according to their affluence and philosophy. In a supposedly universal system, workers would be unequal in their benefits and cost-sharing. Within each firm, owners and managers might continue to give themselves more generous benefits than they give their workers-discrepancies that Congress tried to reduce in 1986 but then re-authorized, because of lobbying by small business. Hospitals and doctors would continue to experience the great complexity and administrative burden of dealing with patients with different coverages and reimbursement procedures. Under most proposals, the state governments would continue to be the regulatory authorities, and wide varia-tions would persist across the country in benefits, financial oversight, and subscriber protection.
Within the same firm, workers can experience changes in coverage and cutbacks from year to year. If he changes jobs, the worker's benefits and administrative procedures change. All this leaves the worker and his family with great uncertainties and unexpected denials.
During the first decades of employment group insurance, American employers paid for all benefits of workers and dependents. Americans became accustomed to think that health care was "free." Contributory plans became common only during the 1980s, but trade unions have fought all but the lowest premiums. Bills for mandatory employment group insurance usually permit employers to recover from the workers no more than one-quarter of the premiums. This will give employers an incentive to shop among insurance carriers for the thinnest benefits. During economic recessions, businessmen's associations have an incentive to press for cutbacks in the law. Because of their low contributory premiums, the American people will continue to lack a full understanding of health care costs.
The personnel departments of business firms will continue their arduous work of negotiating benefit packages with unions and shopping among insurance carriers or third-party administrators for the best deals. Business firms wish to reduce their involvement in the frustrating health financing sector, not increase it.
Medicare and Medicaid-with all their regulations, disputes, and bureaucracies-will continue without change.
All-payer management is prescribed by few of the national employment group bills. Under most proposals, reimbursement rates will continue to differ among payers, hospitals will still shift costs from the less generous to the more generous payers, and recriminations will continue.
The health sector will remain an unorganized mosaic of groups and carriers. Each will try to minimize its own costs, whether by limiting benefits or by "managed care" arrangements with hospitals and doctors. But the entire system is unmanaged, and costs will continue to grow. The many different managed care arrangements will continue to increase the administrative costs of hospitals.
"The Canadian Model"
Once the American and Canadian health financing markets were closely connected and much alike. But Canadian industry was never prosper-ous enough and Canadian trade unions never strong enough to develop an extensive set of employer-paid fringe benefits throughout the country. Outside of a few industrial sites, the scattered Canadian population did not develop the mutual aid funds that became the foundation of European statutory social insurance. Canadian hospitals were owned and managed by nonprofit associations and municipalities, doctors were self-employed, governments had limited power, and the country wanted to avoid the British path to a national health service.
Instead, several western Canadian provincial governments subsidized the hospital inpatient bills of their citizens from their general budgets. The method spread, the national government agreed to share the costs during the 1950s, and soon all hospital operating and capital costs were paid for from provincial government budgets. All physician bills came to be reimbursed from provincial government budgets after the same evolution (Taylor 1978; Evans and Stoddart 1986) .
Frustrated by the uncontrolled growth of American health costs, several influential members of Congress during the late 1980s asked why the United States could not leam from Canadian cost containment. With less spending, Canada delivered advanced care to its entire population, and people seemed satisfied. A rush of American researchers and policy analysts then wrote descriptions of Canada, and several proposals for reform of the United States recommended "the Canadian model" (especially Himmelstein and Woolhandler 1989) .
Political 0 bstacles
Whatever its merits in Canada, the Canadian health financing system will never be enacted in the United States. The Kennedy-Corman Bill of the late 1970s proposed financing from general revenue and exclusive administration of payment by state governments, but it never reached the floors of Congress (Waldman 1976: 121-37) . Enactment now continues to be unlikely for several reasons.
Since heaith financing is part of Canadian government budgets, the leaders of the hospital and physician sectors must conform to the priorities of the Parliament, the Treasury, and the Ministry of Health. The medical profession in all countries avoids such subordination to laymen and to politicians. Health financing often becomes a political controversy in the Canadian mass media and in election campaigns. Fearing this situation, the American Medical Association responded to the mounting interest in the "Canadian model" by attacking it in many issues of the American Medical News and in a national advertising campaign.
Financing is generous during periods of growth and tight when government must control its deficits. When their programs began, Canadian hospitals and doctors thought they would always be guaranteed full operating costs and increasing incomes, but limits were imposed during the late 1970s and 1980s. At first, Canadian hospitals negotiated prospective budgets with provincial governments, but now the latter impose what they can afford to pay (Glaser 1981 (Glaser , 1987 . At first, the provincial medical associations negotiated their fees with provincial governments , but some governments (particularly Quebec and Ontario) then invoked their budgetary constraints and legal sovereignty to dictate the final results. (After a decade of disputes, Quebec, Ontario, and Manitoba in 1991 reluctantly agreed to resolve deadlocks by arbitration .) Conversant with Canadian history, aware of the same evolution in American Medicaid, and fearing stringent across-the-board cost containment in the future, American hospital and medical associations would fight creation of any such single-payer governmental arrangements in the United States.
In each Canadian province, the Ministry of Health pays the hospitals, the ministry or a public corporation pays the doctors, and the insurance companies play no role. The carriers must specialize in supplementary benefits, such as dentistry, pharmaceutical drugs, private hospital rooms , and so on. The American insurance industry can easily block enactment of such an arrangement in the United States.
Learning from Appropriate Foreign Experiences
Americans devoted to a slightly reformed status quo declare it superior to government-run national health services (as in Great Britain and Sweden) and superior to their image of a capital-starved Canada (Enthoven and Kronick 1989: 94; Sullivan 1990) . Their argument seems compelling. But it misleads the policy debate, since the apologists ignore the most politically feasible and the most successful alternative, that is, the statutory health insurance arrangements that much of Europe has been using for a century.
Shortly after Germany enacted the first social security laws for pensions and health insurance, scholars and public officials throughout Europe and North America made site visits and wrote reports about the German precedent and the arrangements that each country subse-quently enacted. The United States government sponsored several of these lessons-from-abroad reports and drafted typical European social security proposals (Commissioner of Labor 191 1 ; Willoughby 1898; Rubinow 1916) . During the 1920s, state officials and professors of economics conversant with the European programs enacted social insurance in Wisconsin and proposed it in New York. They accompanied the Roosevelt administration to Washington and designed the social security law of the national government. The author of the latest lessons-from-abroad book (Armstrong 1932) was the principal drafter of Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI). In order to avoid a fight with the medical association that would lose votes in Congress and antagonize the Supreme Court, the Roosevelt administration temporarily set aside the health insurance component of social security.
After World War 11, statutory health insurance for the entire population was proposed by presidents and by others in 1950, the early 1960s, and the early 1970s. Because of the growing belief that employment group insurance might cover the entire population without legislation, a limited version of statutory health insurance was enacted for the retired alone in 1965. After 1974, the idea of statutory health insurance was forgotten and was replaced by schemes to force laggard employers to cover all their workers. However, it is not possible to achieve the goals of national health insurance in this fashion, as explained above. The policy debate over health financing reform should rediscover its original road.
Statutory Health Insurance for the United States
Following is a brief summary of a statutory health insurance system for the United States, based on the experiences of other countries. Unlike nearly all other entries in the current American policy debate, the following proposal is not my personal imaginary nostrum, but it is derived from the actual operations and successes of other developed countries. This paper-like every article-can only state highlights and must focus on its topic. For complete details about the organization, financing, benefits, problems, and effects of European statutory health insurance see Glaser 1991, the many sources cited therein, and my other publications.
The proposal synthesizes the experience of many countries and is not based on only one. The American policy debate lately has noticed foreign events, but it focuses on one country at a time. The vogue of "the Canadian model" in 1989 was superseded by discussion of a "German model" in 1991. However, cross-national lesson drawing is doomed if one thinks it refers only to reproducing one other country's total system in the United States (for reasons explained in Glaser 1978: 233-47). The lesson-drawing task consists of discovering the consensus of how nearly all developed countries solve the problems they share with the United States, adapting it for the American situation, and identifying the supports and barriers to implementation. This article and the entire research project reported in Glaser 1991 are based on the experience of the successful systems in Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Japan, and on the early experiences of countries that finally substituted national health services (Great Britain, Italy, and Spain).
Statute
As in other countries, Congress would pass a law specifying: =Certain groups in the population must be covered by national health =They have free choice of insurance carrier. They and their employers must pay payroll taxes.
9 Minimum benefits are guaranteed the subscribers. 9 Subscribers have free choice of licensed doctors, hospitals, and other providers. = Conditions are listed for participation by doctors, hospitals, and other providers. Usually all licensed practitioners are eligible. Procedures for exclusion are specified.
9 Conditions are listed for participation by insurance carriers. Usually all mutual aid funds, mutual insurance companies, and stock companies are eligible. How claims, provider reimbursement, and other administrative and financial matters are managed.
insurance.
The law would be part of the Social Security Code, replacing the present Titles XVIII and XIX for Medicare and Medicaid.
Ideally, Congress should enact framework laws and delegate details to the executive branch and to negotiations between payers and providers. That was the custom of Congress before the 1970s, when suspicion of the executive branch and expos& about fraud led Congress to its current practice of fine-tuning everything. In no other country does parliament prescribe so many details. The American practice leads to constant demands by interest groups, legislative entrepreneurship by individual congressmen and senators, and constant overload of the legislature.
Ideally, Congress should enact a law, let it settle down, and avoid annual tinkering. Current practice invites interest groups to demand frequent self-serving revisions, prevents administration from stabilizing, and sows uncertainties and disputes.
Cover age
Usually statutory health insurance evolves over many decades. A country starts with miners and other factory workers and at intervals adds all other blue-collar workers, white-collar workers, the self-employed, farmers, leading managers, the pensioners, and the unemployed. By now, every country has almost complete coverage.
The United States, too, has added occupations successively to the original 1935 coverage of the Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI), so that now everyone is covered. Therefore, perhaps the United States will include all occupations under statutory health insurance from the start.
Pensioners
Everyone would remain in his chosen health insurance carrier after retirement. Benefits would not differ by age. Once a few countries (such as Holland) kept special financial accounts for the pensioners who did not bring in normal payroll taxes, but this distinction has been abolished. Whether the elderly person is still working or is retired makes no difference.
The age of sixty-five would no longer be associated with a change in coverage and financing in the United States. Its special significance is an artifact of America's unique decision to create special statutory health insurance for the retired alone. The Americans at that time mistakenly expected that everyone would remain under private employment group coverage until all retired at sixty-five. Lifelong coverage would eliminate the present gap for most Americans who retire before sixty-five, drop out of their workplace groups, create dilemmas for their employers, and must wait several years for Medicare.
The elderly and disabled pensioners incur high costs but do not bring in high payroll taxes. Part of the shortfall is raised by the sickness fund from payroll taxes levied on those who are economically active, whose tax payments are higher than their medical costs. The rest of the shortfall is covered by public subsidies. Under national health insurance, Medicare would be abolished. The nation would be spared Medicare's large administrative bureaucracy, its stream of incomprehensible regulations, and its endless disputes. The Department of Health and Human Services would maintain a less intrusive and less overloaded agency to oversee the performance of the insurance carriers, to formulate guidelines about procedures and costs, and to oversee the machinery deciding provider reimbursement. Compared to the Health Care Financing Administration, the new agency would be more responsive to subscribers and to providers.
Poor and Unemployed
As in the case of the pensioners, those temporarily without jobs would remain in their original sickness funds. The working poor would be covered at all times, thereby solving America's crisis of the working uninsured. Once many countries had public welfare programs to deliver or pay for the medical care of the poor-that is, arrangements like Medicaid-but now all countries include these persons under normal statutory health insurance with the standard benefits. Rich and poor would differ in income and in living standards, but they would have the same basic health coverage and the poor would receive mainstream services.
As in the case of the pensioners, the financing system would crosssubsidize the medical costs of the poor. The economically active would bring in payroll taxes exceeding their costs. Government would add subsidies. Medicaid would be abolished, and state governments would be relieved of a millstone.
Payrol I Taxes
As in all social security programs, funds are raised primarily from taxes proportionate to earnings. The United States already uses them for Medicare Part A, and they would merely increase for a comprehensive program. The rates could be equal for employee and employer (as in American Medicare and Germany), or they could be higher for employers (as in most countries). In most countries a single nationwide rate is enacted annually by parliament as part of the tax and budget legislation, but Germany allows each health insurance carrier to set its own. Since the carriers break even without profits or losses, the rates can rise or fall each year, after calculations by actuaries and legislation in parliament. In contrast, American social security practice employs prolonged freezes and occasional automatic minute increases if a formula reveals an excessive decline in the reserves.
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law
Financing must be redistributive, to cover the high costs of the elderly, disabled, and poor. Medical costs have increased so much that France and Belgium have eliminated the earnings base in health insurance: the payroll tax falls on the entire salary; in contrast, the payroll tax for social security pensions still falls on wages below a limit. Therefore, the very high earners (and their employers) contribute very large amounts to the health accounts. American Medicare is now moving in this direction: Congress in late 1990 set the earnings base for the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund's payroll tax at about double the base for the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) tax.
Financing health insurance by this method will finally make clear to Americans that their medical care is expensive and they cannot expect "somebody else" to pay for it. The payroll taxes on individuals' earnings-6 percent or more in several European countries, lower than that only if the earnings base is unlimited-will be higher than the premiums in even the most demanding American employment-based contributory schemes. On the other hand, no one need incur the present American expense of individual policies for basic health insurance. The payroll taxes on American employers may be lower than the costs of a generous group plan, and the employers will also be relieved of the administrative burden of the present system. Political skills and a gradual transition will be needed to change from current arrangements to social security financing. Wage adjustments will accompany the shifts of burdens from employers to workers and the addition of the extra social insurance burden on the workers.
The self-employed now pay double the social security rate in the United States-that is, both the workers' and employer's share for OASDI and Medicare-and this would continue in an expanded statutory health insurance. Small businessmen might not resist, since they are already accustomed to paying their own double rate and their share of the payroll tax for their workers. This would seem less burdensome than buying group insurance under the proposed mandates and under the expensive multi-employer pools that they resist. In Europe, the self-employed once opposed their own inclusion under social security, and the compromises allow them lower rates or a lower earnings base.
Tax on Pensions
Once the elderly in Europe paid nothing after retirement but were covered by extra contributions by the economically active and by public subsidies.
But their increasing number and growing costs required substantial contributions. Now they are taxed a proportion of their social security pensions, at rates comparable to the active workers' rates. The need for significant premiums would finally bring to the American elderly a realistic understanding of finance. At present they must pay low premiums for Medicare Part B, but they protest about the size, and Congress nervously avoids substantial increases. The European pensioners pay much more, but their benefits are superior.
A proportionate tax would require lower payments by the low-income pensioners and more money from the richer. The American elderly might cooperate better with a proportionate tax than with the present flat Part B premium. The lower-income elderly have grumbled about the flat premium and have protested against Congress's occasional hesitant attempts to increase it. The richer elderly have lobbied against any attempts to levy extra surcharges on them, and the issue caused the repeal of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988.
Subsidies
Once all statutory health insurance systems were supposed to break even from payroll taxes, but now nearly all are subsidized by national governments from their general budgets. Money must be found to cover the high costs of the retired, disabled, and poor, when these groups pay low premiums and bring in no payroll taxes from employers. The money goes to the health insurance carrier and not directly to the provider or beneficiary. The patients now are never identified as a special class-unlike categorical programs like Medicaid-and their benefits are never cut back to save money.
Subsidies already exist in American health insurance, and the practice would merely continue. Three-quarters of Medicare Part B now comes from the national treasury. Coverage of the poor under Medicaid depends completely on national and state government contributions.
Subsidies and equalization transfers among sickness funds become the methods of preserving a semiprivate system of health insurance carriers, instead of converting health into a completely government-financed and government-dictated sector. Subsidies are a method of supplementing the proportionate payroll taxes with money derived from the progressive income tax. It is not necessary to replace the present payroll tax by a progressive earnings tax or by a progressive tax on all income. Since statutory health insurance hews as closely to the private model as possible, and since the legislators avoid antagonizing powerful interests, the preexisting health insurance carriers are retained as fiscal intermediaries. All carriers are eligible to continue, whether they are mutual aid funds sponsored by trade unions or by consumer movements, mutual insurance companies, or stock companies. Only if the private companies withdraw or fail does government replace them with public corporations-as in part of the French market-but, even then, the new entities are autonomous and are not merely government bureaucracies.
The American health insurance market might become more competitive than it is now. Instead of each carrier winning a monopoly from an employer, all carriers could appeal to the group's workers and their families for individual enrollment. Instead of each carrier winning a monopoly of all Medicare or Medicaid business in an area, all carriers could appeal directly to the elderly and poor individuals. The system would use unlimited free choice, available now on a small scale in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program. Each subscriber's payroll taxes or premiums would go to his carrier. The insurers would strive for the largest number of subscribers yielding the largest revenue. To prevent preferred risk selection, the law would require each carrier to accept any applicant, without medical underwriting and without extra premiums. (This is one of the few regulations of the carriers in statutory health insurance.) Preferred risk selection might also be discouraged by financial equalization transfers between carriers with large profits and carriers with large deficits.
The insurance carriers would become bigger and more important than ever. Their responsibilities in protection of the public interest would increase. They would have to operate within the yield of payroll taxes and public subsidies, they would collaborate with government in setting benefit policies and expenditure targets, and they would be responsible for implementing cost containment. Lest it lose subscribers, each would have to represent its patients in obtaining adequate services and in understanding the delivery system. The carriers would be the principal negotiators with the medical profession in defining work rules and in setting reimbursement. They would participate in hospital rate setting. These roles no longer seem unfamiliar to American health insurers: the Blues have long tried to fulfill them, and the commercial companies too are now trying to become policy leaders and consumer representatives.
Carriers would continue to offer supplementary insurance products.
In mainstream coverage, their discretion over benefits and provider rates would be limited: minimum benefits are set by law, and provider rates are set on an all-payer basis by collective negotiation or by regulation. The carriers' role in statutory health insurance would be that of fiscal administrators, but the American market has already transformed them in this fashion. Employment group health benefits have rapidly become a selfinsured system, where the insurance carrier is retained only to administer enrollments and claims. Insurers have been primarily fiscal intermediaries from the start of Medicare.
Paying the Doctor
Statutory health insurance is organized to resemble a private market as much as possible, in large part because the medical profession opposes government control. The doctors themselves remain self-employed businessmen. Since government cannot dictate their working rules and pay, much must be decided by collective negotiations between the health insurance carriers and the medical association. Disagreements over rules and money often become heated, settlements eventually result from compromise or (rarely) from arbitration, government almost never dictates settlements, and patient care then continues with few interruptions (Glaser 1978 ). The United States should adopt these methods and abandon the uncertainties, conflicts, and incessant government fine-tuning that has permeated Medicare Part B and that will surely continue under the supposed reforms during the coming years (Glaser 1990) . The American medical profession at first will fight proposals that will generalize this experience to all their reimbursement. (See, for example, Adelman's [1992] critique of an early version of this article.) The statutes therefore will include the framework for deciding physicians' working rules and reimbursement. Organized medicine and individual doctors in all countries cooperate (however unhappily) with a system in which they have a voice over their work and income, in which they share responsibility for decisions, but they can block enactment and harmonious implementation of any nationwide arrangements allowing government dictation.
Collective negotiations decide contracts, fee schedules (lists of relative values), and prices (conversion of the relative values into pay rates). Permanent joint committees interpret the fee schedules, review utilization, and perform other tasks. The payer side consists of representatives of all the health insurance carriers. The American medical profession would be represented by a panel from all the medical associations (as in France and Belgium), by a new confederation uniting the AMA and the specialty societies (as in Holland), by the AMA on behalf of all the specialty societies (as in Great Britain), or by a new entity devoted to financial negotiations alone (as in Germany and Quebec).
Negotiations and finances might be managed in one of the following fashions: mCentralized on a national level: The contract, fee schedule, and financial conversion factor would be settled for the entire country, as in countries with unitary governments, such as France, Holland, and Belgium. America already centralizes Medicare in this manner. Setting the conversion rate becomes complicated in large and sprawling countries like the United States, since revenue and provider costs vary across the country. In Medicare, the Americans exercise their penchant for complicated, controversial, and politically logrolled formulae to vary providers' revenue according to local costs of practice and costs of living. Some large countries (such as France) buy the doctors' cooperation by paying all of them high standard rates throughout the country. nationwide negotiations for the contract and fee schedule: The conversion factor is set at the regional or state level, in negotiations between its insurance carriers and its medical associations. The financial accounts are kept within each region: provider reimbursement is coordinated with the high or low fiscal capacity of each region, without the formulae and political manipulation to vary average national rates. An example is Germany. m Regional or provincial negotiation of the entire relationship between payers and doctors: Each region or state would have its own contract, fee schedule, prices, and financial accounts. The principal regulators and monitors would be the regional or state governments. Some nationwide similarities would be preserved by regulations and conditional subsidies from the national government. Examples are Switzerland and Canada. The United States conducts Medicaid in this fashion , but greater standardization and patient protection would be necessary under decentralized American statutory health insurance.
Regardless of the form of negotiations, the result is always an all-payer system: all carriers under statutory health insurance pay the same rates according to the same fee schedule. Whether the official fee is always full payment can be one of the options in designing American statutory health insurance. A doctor can extra-bill in a few countries (such as Belgium) but usually charges only a few patients only small amounts of extra cash: the medical professions there are solicitous of their patients (particularly the numerous elderly) and wish to avoid crackdowns by the public and by government, During periods when official fees are being increased slowly, government and the insurance carriers may try to appease the doctors by allowing extra-billing, but (as in France) the concession eventually is withdrawn.
Health maintenance organizations might continue to attract patients as multispecialty groups with superior facilities and high-quality providers.
But they can no longer lock in their users, since the statute guarantees freedom of choice. Independent practice associations (IPAs) would no longer be necessary, since the entire system would operate like an all-inclusive IPA with managed care methods. The medical profession in America-as in other countries-would be better off than before. At first the fees are set at the private market rates, and the negotiations steadily increase them. Doctors have more patients and more work than before (because of universal coverage at full rates), they no longer have bad debts or delays in payment, and administrative costs diminish. Because fees are standardized and predictable, because incomes are secure, and because disputes are fewer, individual doctors would be able to concentrate on clinical work.
Paying the Hospital
The health insurance system is supposed to pay each hospital the costs for adequate performance of its work, with neither profits nor losses. Government and the health insurance carriers need to scrutinize hospitals' financial claims carefully, since the totals make up half of all health spending, since hospitals have been at the root of several countries' cost crises, and since evaluating their needs is very complicated. Hospitals are expected to file accounts of past utilization and spending, and to file prospective budgets for next year's claims. In several countries (such as France, Holland, and Switzerland), these papers are studied by rate regulators expert in hospital operations, equipped with data for peer comparisons, and empowered to examine the hospital's books. After cutting some padded lines, the regulator approves the hospital's budget for next year (Glaser 1987 : 119-61) .
The health insurance carriers negotiate with the doctors bilaterally, and settle on compromise rates after power bargaining. The rates cover the doctors' costs and as much markup for income as the doctors can win. Investigating hospital accounts to establish the break-even rates to cover all clinical needs is beyond the capacity of sickness funds, so most countries with statutory health insurance rely on respected neutral regulators. The local sickness funds scrutinize the hospital's rate application in France and Holland and advise the rate regulators about the hospital's performance. In Germany, the sickness funds negotiate with each hospital as they do with the medical association, and no rate regulator is used, but this is unusual. In no country with statutory health insurance does government dictate the hospital's rates, as it does in countries with full public financing (such as Canada) or as in American Medicare. During the drafting of American universal statutory health insurance, the hospitals would initially request full payment for the budgets they themselves propose, but they would probably settle for the usual device of screening and approval by a neutral regulator. The method has already been used in several states, such as Maryland, whose methods resemble Holland's.
How to deliver the money to the hospital during the year is one of the options in designing American statutory health insurance. The global budget might be paid in installments, with shares divided among the local sickness funds, according to their shares of the hospitals' admissions. Or, the expected hospital budget is divided by the predicted total number of patient days, and the hospital bills each insurance carrier the resulting per diem, according to that carrier's total patient days.
Reimbursement is an all-payer system. The per diem is an average; the hospital and the insurance carrier gain or lose on individual cases. Unlike present American practice, the hospital management can no longer shift costs from one payer to another: it does not risk deficits from low-paying patients and instead is expected to cover its costs over the year from all patients. European hospitals once could overspend and recover their losses from extra rate increases during the next year, but now they must operate within their budgets. Supplements can be obtained only if the hospital demonstrates unavoidable clinical requirement, such as increases in admissions due to sudden population growth or epidemics.
While some specialist physicians can earn extra cash from a small market of private payers and the privately insured, usually almost the entire revenue of the hospital comes from social insurance. American hospitals would be much better off, since they would be guaranteed their costs and would have no more bad debts. If government and the health insurance funds judge that small rural hospitals are needed, they survive, despite low occupancy. Unintended bankruptcies become rare. The only losers would be the hospital financial departments: their work would be simpler, their staffs would be smaller, and the chief financial officers would become less important.
Every country uses methods that cover each hospital's full costs. None uses standard rates across a class of hospitals, like American diagnosisrelated groups. The starting point is each hospital's clinical plan, past performance, and prospective budget. No country follows American Medicare's methods of complicated calculations from a national database, in order to fix an optimum rate for an "efficient" hospital. Efficiency is judged by the sickness funds and by the rate regulator after examining each hospital, not by profits on a balance sheet.
Capita I Investment
An important function of government in most countries with statutory health insurance is to provide grants for new buildings and for expensive equipment. New programs are concentrated in a few places, at first in the teaching hospitals. Once their effectiveness is proved, they are placed selectively throughout the country at major hospitals with expert staffs. Patients are brought there, so the staffs have sufficient volume to justify the investment and to develop skills. Expensive programs are not allowed to proliferate throughout the country, with high expenditure, low volume, and an incentive to utilize unnecessarily. In similar fashion, the American government granted money to hospitals in the Hill-Burton program (Glaser 1987: 208-62) .
The American method that succeeded Hill-Burton is rarely permitted abroad: the medical staff of a hospital wants the latest in new equipment; it forces the hospital management to buy the new equipment and modernize the building, or it will take its patients to a competing hospital; the hospital borrows in the bond market, with the endorsement of a local government agency; the insurance companies and Medicare automatically agree to the amortization as part of operating costs; the doctors utilize (and overutilize) the new program to enable the hospital to repay the loan and in order to increase their own incomes. Holland once was the only European country to allow this method and costs exploded: now, Dutch planners must approve the new installations, and Dutch rate regulators are stricter in allowing amortization in the prospective operating budget. France and Switzerland allow hospitals to borrow from special capital funds, but their governments and health insurance carriers must approve each application. Ideally, hospital systems planning should set priorities and should govern the capital grants, but Europe's individual hospitals (and their political protectors) have resisted planners, and planning methodology has developed slowly. In order to contain costs and establish a more efficient distribution of increasingly expensive services, public planning is gradually intervening.
Cost Containment
Every statutory health insurance system must operate within limits. Payroll taxes and government subsidies cannot rise indefinitely. Economic downturns in Europe during the late 1970s and 1980s necessitated a halt to the previous cost explosion, which had resulted from a combination of hospital modernization, increases in health personnel, higher wages in health, new technology, higher utilization by both old and young, and so on. Several cost pressures still remain as strong as ever, such as the increase in utilization by an aging population and the greater service intensity for all. Statutory health insurance guarantees access by all and gives doctors discretion to prescribe all recognized therapies. No country tries to limit expenditures by the methods common in American private insurance, namely, reductions in the eligible population, denials of benefits, and large shifts in claims payment to insured patients.
Government monitors the cost problems of statutory health insurance, but it does not dictate limits: the health insurance carriers, the hospitals, and the doctors are autonomous and resist government dictation. The parts of the system must be "coordinated" to control costs, but they are not "centralized" under government. (Even a national health service managed and financed by government is not as "centralized" as one expects.) The providers wish higher remuneration, better facilities, and discretion in giving services; patients wish prompt access to the best services; the taxpayer and budget officers wish to limit taxes and borrowing. A form of negotiations has developed among the interest groups, political parties, and government ministries that are spokesmen and protectors for the social groupings of payers and users. Germany uses a forum that brings the interest groups, insurance carriers, and providers together to agree on policy. Less structured negotiations occur within parliament and among government ministries in all other countries with statutory health insurance, such as France and Holland.
Without a definition of the public interest, the various groups would struggle for maximum self-centered advantage. Consensus has developed that health services must continue to be available and that costs must be consistent with the country's fiscal capacity. An important role of government is to provide trustworthy facts: on the services side, data about trends in morbidity, utilization, technology, and wages; on the revenue side, data about employment, earnings, and inflation in the entire economy. The problem is to develop a consensus about expenditure targets for all health sectors next year, so that adequate care can be delivered without running deficits in the insurance and government accounts, without necessitating excessive increases in taxes and borrowing.
The final consensus is worked out among the ministries representing the different interest groups (health, budget, finance, labor, industry, and social affairs) rather than by parliament. In an American statutory insurance system, the contentious details would be hammered out each year within the executive branch and would not overburden Congress. The guidelines would then be transmitted by the executive agencies to the persons who implement them, that is, the negotiators who set physicians' pay, the administrators of utilization review, the hospital rate regulators, and others. In practice, they hew close to the guidelines, since the sickness funds are reluctant to offer more money, and since the sickness funds and governments no longer automatically cover deficits. Statutory health insurance cannot be kept under fixed caps, because patients are entitled to care on their own initiative and because doctors have discretion in prescribing. But its cost containment methods have achieved nearly the same limits as have the publicly managed systems. Therefore costs can be contained even without full governmentalization.
costs
A recent tactic by American advocates of inaction is the argument that nothing should be done until America stops the growth in its health care spending. Then, no reform should be enacted unless it is "budget neutral"-that is, spending no more than the status quo. Meanwhile, America's health care analysts find new and profitable employment in simulating the future costs of all the proposed reforms, as in the Advisory Council on Social Security (1991: 379-642) .
Unfortunately for this scenario, the United States cannot stabilize the costs of its current uncoordinated arrangements. As the experiences of other countries show, costs cannot be stabilized unless a comprehensive managed system is substituted.
Unfortunately for all attempts to simulate future expenditures, experiences show that every reform initially increases health care spending for 716 Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law several reasons: the doctors' cooperation must be bought with higher fees, access widens, utilization grows, neglected conditions (such as dentistry) are brought to providers on a large scale, and so on. The only reform that would reduce health costs would be the elimination of third-party coverage. Statutory health insurance of the type described in this article would alter the flow of most current spending through new channels and would increase it by expanding access for the uninsured and by improving benefits for the underinsured. Neither I nor anyone else can predict the future spending under this or any other reform. One can only predict that social protection would improve and that cost containment machinery for the long term would be installed.
Private Health Insurance
A private market would remain, depending on the niches left under the statute. Besides administering finance for the mainstream program, the health insurance carriers may also offer private policies. If several classes of persons can opt out of the system-as in Germany today and Holland before 1990-the private companies can sell them as much private coverage as they want.
The principal private market is supplementary coverage for the socially insured. An option in the design of American statutory health insurance is the amount of cost sharing required of patients. Some countries have had little cost sharing, but several of them recently added copayments and coinsurance either to deter waste (as in pharmaceutical prescription charges in many countries) or to reduce the burden on the sickness funds (as in German hospital copayments and Dutch dental coinsurance). Some countries have always had coinsurance as part of their designs (such as France, Belgium, and Switzerland), and both American private insurance and Medicare have required much. So, doubtless American statutory health insurance will have substantial cost sharing, thus creating a market for private supplementary coverage, as in the case of American Medigap and the French fonds mutuelles. However, each subscriber's ownership of two policies complicates a system that is supposed to be simple and invites controversy over whether the supplementary coverage destroys the supposed cost-saving deterrent effects from the patients' participation.
If certain benefits are omitted or are limited in statutory health insurance, private policies can be offered for them. Examples are some dentistry, psychiatric visits beyond a maximum number under social insurance, nursing homes, and home care.
Private companies can remain the primary insurers in work accidents and auto accidents.
Political Feasibility
Can the foregoing scheme be enacted? Is the political situation in Washington so confused and are the opponents so powerful that-like other reforms-it cannot be adopted? Or, would it be enacted with so many amendments that it would be unworkable? Every great reform depends on the balance of political forces and on the skill of political leadership.
Forces in Favor
Perhaps the strongest source of support is the widespread exhaustion over health care financing among the general public and policymakers. By 1993 in Washington and elsewhere in the country, one hears intensifying complaints about escalating costs along with disillusionment about the effectiveness of favorite nostrums, such as managed care, competitive markets, and the Canadian model. America adopted a universal system of the European sort to solve the crisis of income security in 1935, and one now hears widespread calls for a "universal" and "comprehensive system" in health. Statutory health insurance of the sort described in this article would be a welcome alternative to the American bugaboos of "nationalization," "centralization," and "dictation by Washington bureaucrats. '' Particular interest groups in the population might enlist behind a general reform. The trade unions and political Left in all countries are important forces behind social security and statutory health insurance, and they already are in the United States. They would have to be persuaded to accept substantial payroll taxes in return for an improved system and limits on point-of-service cost sharing. Workers and their families already find their coverage is no longer "free" and must pay mounting contributory premiums.
Interest groups representing the poor and minority groups could also be mobilized. They would be insured with normal benefits, and all providers would accept these persons more readily.
In most countries, Big Businessmen at first oppose social security and statutory health insurance, because they must pay large payroll taxes and because they prefer free markets and self-reliance. However, the financial and administrative burdens of employment-based health benefits have panicked many American business leaders, and they would welcome a substitute capable of limiting their personnel costs, relieving them of responsibility for the increasingly expensive retirees, and transferring all administrative work to the carriers. Business leaders' normal antipathy to government intervention can be overcome, since their preferred solution of decentralized private managed care is unsuccessful, statutory health insurance is more orderly and less expensive than what American business now faces, and an important sector of business (the insurance industry) would administer statutory health insurance.
Threatened with exclusion by the Canadian model, American health insurance companies could become important advocates of statutory health insurance. They would handle more money, would risk fewer deficits, would participate in policy-making , would receive credit from representing the interests of the public and of their subscribers, and would be the principal negotiators with providers. They could still compete for market share, appealing to individual subscribers and no longer wooing the Capricious managers of employed groups. The insurance companies could still market supplementary health policies and more profitable lines, such as life insurance.
Certain associations of health providers could be enlisted. Usually an important constituency for the passage of statutory health insurance, the nonprofit and public hospitals would be guaranteed their costs. They would no longer have bad debts, need to shift costs among payers, and experience so many disputes. The inevitable restraint would be rate regulation and capital planning, but the trade-off would be an opportunity to focus on their clinical mission.
Barriers
Ideological objections would have to be overcome. The utopian belief in the efficacy of free markets, in unlimited consumer and provider choice, and in fragmented managed care would finally have to be abandoned. For a decade, the ideology has bewitched the American health policy establishment and the country's medical economists. Confronted by empirical facts and the plight of American patients, much of Washington has begun to look elsewhere during the 1990s.
The philosophy of social solidarity and of social protection would have to be accepted in health-as it previously was in the enactment of other social reforms. Americans would have to accept the levels of payroll taxation and public subsidies necessary to protect the poor, the dissolute, and unpopular minority groups. Such tax and spending increases have already occurred in a half-hearted and chaotic manner during the 1980s. In statutory health insurance and its related reforms, these tax and spending increases would be planned, controlled, and generally understood.
In every country, the medical profession is the principal critic of the first proposals for statutory health insurance. In contrast, American organized medicine is aware of the need for reform and-during the early 1960s, the mid-l970s, and 1990-has proposed its own designs. To American doctors, some system is preferable to the present fragmented administration with multiple payers, bad debts, cost shifting, and guerrilla warfare with government. Doctors prefer the utopia of individual fee setting to the collective rates inherent in universal statutory health insurance. The inevitable compromise is one that American medical associations have long understood, namely, decision-making machinery wherein the medical profession's elected representatives participate in all policies and negotiate with payers over money and working conditions. Under statutory health insurance, the individual American doctor would be pleased with more money, fewer hassles, and the opportunity to focus on clinical care.
Small businessmen would resist statutory health insurance, just as they now oppose mandated group coverage. Their current objections include higher payments, ideological aversion to social protection, and the administrative trouble from special group contracts. Under other American proposals for mandated group coverage, small business would be singled out. However, small businessmen might be induced to accept extension of a program in which they already participate: they now pay social security taxes for their employees and for themselves, statutory health insurance would merely add a few percentage points, payroll taxes are more stable than employment group premiums, and someone else (the carriers) would assume all the administration pursuant to a general public policy.
Several other American provider groups would criticize the statutory health insurance scenario described in this paper. But all must adjust to any effective reform that is better than worsening chaos. American forprofit hospitals have long opposed cost containment and health planning, but they too now suffer from the instabilities and erratic expenditure controls of the present situation. For-profit hospitals operate like all other hospitals in German statutory health insurance, and they can play a similar role in an American program. The pharmaceutical and equipment industries might fear the expenditure limits and plans of an American statutory health insurance, but they can continue to prosper with complete clinical freedom, as their experiences in Europe demonstrate. One lesson from Europe is that social security and health care are so important and so controversial that a reform requires an all-out effort by the head of government. The president or prime minister must understand all the issues and political forces, must explain the proposal to the country, must mobilize supporters, must disarm opponents, and must expend his political capital in the parliament. Such political skill and determination have been scarce in all sectors of American domestic politics lately. President Bush justified his policy of minimum change in health by misrepresenting the methods of other countries as tyrannical, wasteful, and neglectful of patients (see, for example, Bush 1992) . No reformwhether the one described in this paper or any other-is possible without sophisticated understanding and effective leadership by the president. Only a president can do the strategic thinking for a fundamentally new system.
Since effective nationwide health insurance is a public-private partnership, Congress, too, must be willing to understand a complex sector and enact a system requiring it to play a new role. At present, Congress tries to enact complex and logrolled programs and then to micromanage them. Some critics believe that congressmen gain politically by manipulating the legislation and its administration, so they can win the favor of individual constituents and political action committees (Fiorina 1989) . Health is one of the intricate, disputatious, and expensive fields where the political costs to a legislator exceed the benefits. To cope with such areas of public policy involving large payments, high costs, complex subject matter, litigation, and overload of Congress-environmental protection, occupational safety, aviation, and nuclear regulation-Congress during the 1980s created "negotiated rule making." Congress sets the guiding principles in a framework law, allows the interested parties to negotiate rules and financial rates, and approves the results with few amendments. The method has been recommended for all government programs where appropriate by the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, enacted overwhelmingly by all political parties and by all ideological camps (Administrative Conference of the United States 1990) . Therefore, a statutory health insurance system managed by the private sector pursuant to law and under public oversight is politically feasible in the United States, as well as urgent.
